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CHAPTER I 
Dignity in Ho1ner and Classical Greece
Patrice Rankine 
"tl\
\Var is war, but dinner should be served on time. 
-UKRAINIAN SAYING 
Woven into the distress of Homeric epic, which often laments the 
terrors of war, the violence of passion, and the desperation of life, are 
records of ancient customs that hint at a deep respect for culture and 
human worth. To take but one example, recall Hector's refusal to take 
wine from his mother when he is bloody from battle. This moment 
is apt to strike modern readers as trivial. In fact, it reifies important 
ancient distinctions between war and peace, home and battlefield, 
and the equally ancient sentiment that to everything, there is a sea­
son. In this case, no matter what has occurred in war in Homer's Iliad,
the poem makes clear there is a time to put away unrest, eat together, 
and, afterward, revere humanity. That is, there is an injunction to 
make space for acting in ways that acknowledge mutual value. Thus a 
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repeated formula throughout the epics to affirm that "after they [ often 
male warriors] had put away their desire for eating and drinking;' then 
comes a time for the bard's entertainment, games, or strategic discus­
sions (e.g., book 12.310 ).1 As Jasper Griffin describes this element of the
epics," Eating together is a universal mark of union, creating a bond:' 2 
Given such a framework, one begins to wonder whether a concept of 
human dignity existed as early as Homeric society ( twelfth through the 
eighth centuries DCE). Admittedly, there are reasons to balk. Homeric 
Greeks engaged in ruthless war and acts of pillage, and at times mun­
danely bought and sold persons at a price, as slaves. Moreover, nowhere 
do the epics offer anything like explicit, formal criteria of human worth 
that could be aligned easily to our contemporary western notion of 
dignity. Homeric epics do not speak explicitly of an inherent or 
unearned moral status, which status all humans share equally, and 
which is supposed to ground fundamental human rights or protec­
tions.3 Nevertheless, I shall argue that the epics do describe an array of 
social practices that can be understood as precursors to such formal­
ized criteria. Normative practices, such as sacrifice and reverence for 
the gods and the treatment of others, demonstrated in such moments 
as mealtime, suggest that there was indeed a sense in which individu­
als were "raised above all price;' to borrow the Kantian language for 
human dignity (AK 4:434). 
To make this argument, it will be worth framing my chapter in terms 
of one specific claim regarding human dignity, namely, that dignity 
culminates in protections through law or through universal declara­
tion, for example, as is true in the Universal Declaration of Human 
1 For all translations, I have used a combination of my own reading of the Greek, along with some 
aspects chat I like from Richmond Lattimore, western's translation, Stanley Lombardo's, and the Loeb 
translation by A. T. Murray. 
1 Jasper Griffin, Homer on Life and Dwb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
3 In speaking of "formal" criteria, I'm alluding to Remy Debes's distinction between substantive 
and formal claims of human dignity. Remy Debes, "Dignity's Gauntlet," Philosophic,,! Perspectives 13 
(2.003): 52.. 
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Rights of 1948. Now, on the one hand, some have thought declarations 
like these to be mere historical contingencies because dignity itself is 
contingent. Leonard Harris makes such an argument in his critique of 
postcoloniality.4 For Harris, postcolonial theorists would make claims
like this to restore historically "impotent agents" -blacks, women, 
non-Europeans-with a kind of dignity, as if dignity itself were not 
always contingent (255). Harris argues that there are only "casual 
agents" within contingent contexts, and thus even seeming funda­
mental moral "truths" like human dignity are correspondingly limited 
(254). On the other hand, of course, many others think declarations of 
fundamental protections and rights reflect an important reality about 
the "true" inner worth of humans.5 But which side of this particular
debate is correct doesn't concern me here. For my purposes, it suffices 
to highlight the tendency to run together the existence of a concept 
of dignity with its explicit enshrinement in something like a formal 
declaration of rights. I will show that this tendency risks misleading 
us when it comes to the Greeks. Thus, consider my hypothesis again, 
now reformulated: The Greeks expressed a belief in human dignity. 
Although they made no explicit (or philosophical) claim such as the 
Universal Declaration asserts, they endorsed what Remy Debes calls 
a "substantive" concept of dignity implicitly in practice; that is, they 
treated human nature as being something that made it the basis of a 
fundamental worth or status, though they did not theorize about the 
4 Leonard Harris, "Honor, Eunuchs, and the Postcolonial Subject." in l'o.<tcoloni,tl African 
Philosophy: A Critical Re,1dcr, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Ezc (New York: Blackwell, 1997), 151-59. 
I am grateful to Professor Harris for reading a draft of this chapter and suggesting improvements. 
5 As the prevailing view, examples of this alternative claim are in the ofling.1hus, consider that "post­
human" theories now speak of the "indignity" that we, as human subjects, might someday avoid by 
using technological advancement to overcome disease, deprivation, decay, and even death.1hese post­
human theories strike many as wrongheaded precisely because they turn on a basic misunderstanding 
of what dignity is. As Charles T. Rubin argues, such an approach takes a "contemptuous attitude to 
what we actually are" (161), as if to be limited in any way is to suffer the loss of dignity (making a "dig­
nified death" an oxymoron). Charles T. Rubin, "Human Dignity and the Future of Man," in Hum,m 
Dignity ,md Bioethics, ed. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Adam Schulman, and 1homas W. Merrill (Notre 
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2009), 155-71. 
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general conceptual features of that status.6 In particular, they typically
did not see the dishonor of others-such as non-Greeks or enemies­
in terms of either impotence (as one might see an orphan in ancient 
times) or the hyperhuman (giants, Cyclops, etc., which also is to deny 
humanity to an other). On the contrary, the Greeks asserted a sub­
stance of dignity to be offered to others, even to those unlike them­
selves. The substance of this dignity is a precursor to a formal claim 
such as Kant's. 
To be perfectly clear, then, the goal is not to argue for some hith­
erto unnoticed explicit doctrine of dignity in Greek thought. Despite 
the formalization of so many philosophical concepts by ancient Greek 
philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, human dignity was not 
one of them.7 Indeed, there is simply no succinct language for such a 
concept. The Greek adjective axios is the closest approximation to the 
Latin word that will come to be translated as "dignity;' dignus (adjec­
tive), or dignitas (abstract noun) (which itself does not go as far as a 
universal or legal claim).8 And yet the word axios, derived from the 
verb ago, "lead;' "carry;' "hold," has to do with the value given to per­
sons and things, as with "worth" in English. It is no surprise, then, that 
what has "worth" (axios) in Greek is something with an equivalence 
to other things, in terms of value. The advent of coinage in Greece 
allowed for a correspondence of the item of worth to a monetary value. 
Thus a diamond, of a certain monetary value, also has worth within 
society, in terms of those things with which it can be exchanged. And 
the same connotation of axios is applied to people in Homer. This is 
only a connotation because it is clear that human reason and emotions 
6 See Debes's introduction to this volume. 
7 See George Kateb, Httm,m Dignity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, w11). W hen for• 
malization of human dignity first occurred is as yet an open question and one being explored in this 
volume.1he philosophical formalization might be attributed to Kant (see Sensen in this volume), but 
the legal claim of universal human dignity does not occur until after World War II, as LaVaque-Manty 
argues in this volume. 
8 See Griffin in this volume. 
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differentiate us from inanimate things. At the same time, the listener 
hears that a handful of heroes are not worth-not equal in value to­
Hector.9 The statement is an evaluation of Hector's military prowess 
and, from what we know of Hector throughout the poem, his own 
system of values, which prioritizes the gods, family, the city, and his 
fellow man. Because of these values, Hector is worth much to his city, 
Troy-more than money, more than other men. In short, persons, like 
material objects, have value in comparison to other objects-and even 
to other persons. 10 Moreover, "worth" is cognate to the Sanskrit vart-, 
Latin verteri, "to turn;' which takes on the meaning of"to become;' as in 
changing or "turning" into something else. The link between "worth" 
and "becoming" (verteri, and also ago) already hints ataxios in Greek as 
not an intrinsic value but as something one moves toward, something 
even earned, further buttressing a sense of value that comes about in 
relation to other things. Axios is thus not the equivalent to human dig­
nity as that concept is generally understood today. Instead, axios points 
to the complex of words linked to human value in Homeric society. 
Such value is always contingent, comparative, not intrinsic. It might 
be argued that each individual was raised above price, such that a slave 
in Homer (Eumaeus) is understood to be (and to have been) noble. 
Conversely, a noble could become a slave. Yet there was no widespread 
threat to human dignity that necessitated the philosophical position. 
Indeed, the Greek axios slowly became an attribute linked to social 
class or rank in society. By the fifth century, for example, abstract forms 
of axios (e.g., axioma and axiosis) began to appear in Herodotus and 
the playwrights and were clearly references to the "honor" or reputa­
tion of persons, making its ultimate meaning very close to the later 
9 Liddell and Scott's entry for Homer 8.134. 
ro 1he parallel passage cited in Liddell and Scott is from Herodotus, where Solon implicitly cor­
rects Croesus's sense of what is valuable-namely, noble stock-for the worth of common Athenian 
youth, Cleobis and Biron, who sacrificed their lives by taking on the yoke of oxen to make sure their 
mother arrived at the temple of Delphi. See Herodotus r.JI-Jl. Whether their good behavior is a 
result of their Athenianness begs the question of human dignity, despite the emphasis on their low 
social standing that might evidence universal dignity. 
--- - -b--�--
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Latin dignus/dignitas. Dignus, which is used in Latin much the way 
axios was used in Greek, stems from a complex of words having to do 
with appearance: Greek doceo, doxa, and Latin decet, derns, "seemly;' 
"comely," derived from the Sanskrit word having to do with fame, dar­
as. And obviously nothing in this family of meaning points to a sense 
of dignity as a moral worth or stature that transcends contingencies, 
with which a person might perhaps be born. 
Despite the absence of a universal or formal claim to human dig­
nity, however, or even the explicit language that would support such 
a claim, it would be a mistake to conclude that the substance of a con­
cept of dignity did not exist in Homeric Greece. In other words, just 
because we don't find a theory of dignity in Homer, we should not 
think the content is completely absent. Dignity is a concept similar to 
what Orlando Patterson argues regarding "freedom:• in Freedom in the 
Making of Tfestern Civilization, if only in the following respect: like 
freedom, dignity is a widespread human value that is not articulated, 
argued for, or formalized until extensive threats to it arise, along with 
the possibility of its loss.11 Certainly honor can be lost in Patterson's 
analysis, and slavery brings its indignity. Here I am simply echoing 
Patterson's argument for "freedom" as that argument pertains to dig­
nity: widespread threats to Greek freedom, according to Patterson, 
occur in the fifth century BCE, when the rise of chattel slavery sud­
denly made peoples vulnerable who hitherto had not faced the pos­
sibility of enslavement.12 Although the Greeks (from 1600 BCE to at 
least the Hellenistic period) were not immune to violations of human 
dignity-which is to say, they did act in ways that today we would say 
violate dignity-still, there was no cultural catastrophe so devastating 
as to require its formal amplification far all Greeks, whether in legal or 
other discursive terms. The incidental slave, captured enemy, or fall of a 
city were not enough to cause these casual agents to come to a universal 
11 Orlando Pmerson, Freedom in the M,1king ofiVestern Civilization (New York: Ba�ic Books, 1991). 
,, Patterson, Freedom. 
I 
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formulation of what they had lost. Instead, human dignity is a sub­
stantive given, and it is evident in several respects, from Homeric epic 
through the classical period in Greece. In par�icular, it is literally put 
into practice throughout the literature from Homer to the playwrights. 
Thus, while it might seem that the treatment of Achilles or Hector 
and their peers in Homeric epic stems only from their elevated status 
within society, their nobility, or their fame, I will argue that a close 
inspection of how the wider world is treated belies such a reading. 
Alongside the representation of these high-ranked individuals, the 
treatment of slaves, animals, and the material world shows that the 
value extended to the noble classes is to a great extent also afforded to 
others. 
THE HOMERIC CONTEXT: AcHILLEs's TREATMENT 
OF HECTOR IN THE fLIAD 
The last book of Homer's Iliad has as its centerpiece a scene that is one 
of the most poignant expressions of human dignity. The eighth cen­
tury DCE epic poem opens with Achilles's menis, a cursed (oulomenen) 
"anger" that "brought countless pains on the Achaians, and hurled 
the strong souls of many heroes into the depths." The immediate rea­
son for Achilles's anger is that he feels he has suffered the violation 
of his honor (time), his contextual claim as a chieftain, at the hands 
of Agamemnon, who has come to Troy on behalf of Agamemnon's 
brother Menelaus to retrieve Helen. In Homer, Helen is the cause of 
the conflict, whereas the classical Athenian historian Thucydides attri­
butes the war to Agamemnon's ambition, which his formidable navy 
affirmed.13 Archaeological remains corroborate ongoing conflict at the
site of Troy leading into the twelfth century DCE. Whatever the cause 
of the culminating battles, Homer allows a focus on a culture and its 
13 See 1lrncydides 1.1-13. 
- - --- ...... __.-
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values, the violation of which leads to Achilles's anger within the epic, 
poetic frame. This context allows for a focus on what human dignity 
might look like in the hands of the Greeks. 
By the opening of book I of Homer's Iliad, the Greek forces have 
sacked the stronghold of Eetion, and Agamemnon has taken as his 
war prize (geras) Chryseis, the daughter of a priest of Apollo. When 
her father Chryses comes to retrieve Chryseis, Agamemnon not only 
insults the holy man, but later threatens to take Achilles's geras, Briseis, 
should he be forced to return his. The threat to Achilles-of the loss of 
Briseis-is the first of a series of slights-perceived or real-to Achilles 
(breaches of his honor) in the Iliad. The audience soon discovers (later in 
book I and in book 9) that Achilles's excessive reaction is really about his 
own mortality, the poignancy of war revealing both the fundamentally 
human reality of impending death and the few consolations that living 
might bring in the meanwhile: the esteem that others can grant, rewards 
for our labor, trust in social, cultural, and legal processes, to name only a 
few. Charles Rubin's framework of the "hyperhuman" would see indig­
nity in mortality and death itself; for the Greeks, the treatment of the 
person in light of these realities is where dignity is preserved. 
If book I establishes the motif of Achilles's menis, then the twenty­
fourth and final book of the Iliad resolves this central theme. Whatever 
the deeper causes, Achilles immediately refuses to fight the Trojans 
because of Agamemnon's theft of Briseis, and the result is the loss of 
the best warrior on the battlefield. The enemy brings fire to the ships 
of Achilles's forces, the Myrmidons, and this in turn incites Patroclus 
to enter the battle (in book 16), dressed as Achilles. In book I and 
throughout, we learn that along with Briseis, Patroclus is the only 
other person at Troy dear to Achilles; some aspects of the reception 
tradition (pottery, for example) even have Patroclus as Achilles's lover. 
The intimate friendship or love relationship sets up a catastrophic loss 
for Achilles when Hector, the most beloved of king Priam's fifty sons 
and the foremost fighter of the Trojans, kills Pa trod us. Patroclus' death 
sets the stage for the central battle of the Iliad, that between Achilles 
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and Hector (book 22), which Achilles wins. By this point in the nar­
rative, Achilles's cursed and overweening anger first at Agamemnon, 
then at Hector, but essentially a struggle with his own mortality-is 
such that he begins to drag the corpse of Hector around the city of 
Troy to exact vengeance for Patroclus's death. He drags Hector's body 
three times initially, when he first kills Hector, and continues to do so 
for twelve days. He refuses to eat or drink during that time. 
My argument, in light of the foregoing summary, is that the violation 
of a substantive human dignity is evident in Achilles's implicit rejec­
tion of the idea of forgiveness and reconciliation. He would express 
remorse-or at least cessation of his activities-in his willingness to 
eat and to allow Hector's family to bury their son. Instead, he performs 
actions roundly repudiated throughout the culture, whether we look 
to the actions that the gods model, or normative behaviors that dem­
onstrate where Achilles has gone wrong. 
Book 24 opens with Achilles's wayward ritual, one that replaces the 
normative processes that preserve a sense of value (or dignity), prac­
tices of assembly, meals, and sleep: 
Patroclus' funeral games were done, and the hosts scattered, each 
and every man going to his own ship. Surely they provided for 
food and delighted in sleep. Not Achilles. He wept at the memory 
of his beloved companion, nor did sleep that tames all take him, 
but he turned this way and that, longing for the manhood and val­
iant might of Patroclus. He wound through the memories of all he 
had done with Patroclus and all the pain he had borne. Achilles 
thought about his own experiences in men's wars in grievous waves. 
Remembering these things he would cry profusely, turning to and 
fro in his bed, now on his side, now on his back, and now on his 
face. Then again he would get up and roam along the shore of the 
sea, distraught. 
At daybreak, as the sun shone over the sea and the beaches, he'd 
be ready. Every time, he would yoke his swift horses to the chariot, 
----�  ···-- . �-------
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and bind Hector behind the chariot and drag him. When he had 
hauled him three times around the dirt heap coving (Patroclus] the 
dead son of Menoetius, he would pause again in his tent, but he 
would allow Hector to be outstretched on his face down in the dirt. 
(24.1-18) 
Into this madness of Achilles's sacrilegious ritual enters Priam, an aged, 
wise, and highly esteemed ruler, to retrieve the body of his son. The fact 
of this juxtaposition of dead and living, defeated and victorious, is the 
crux of why the scene matters to the substantive discussion of human 
dignity. Dignity as a substantive virtue in Homeric society underpins 
the passage. Achilles has, for a time, ignored the ritual economy of war 
and peace-enemies, but human-and has violated the worth of his 
adversary. It is precisely a restoration of worth that Priam would seem 
to request. Thus, Priam slips unseen, with the help of the gods, who 
support the restoration of dignity, into enemy territory.14 Arriving at
Achilles's hut, Priam "clasped in his hands (Achilles'] knees, and kissed 
his hands, the terrible (deinas), man-slaying hands that had slain his 
many sons."15
This phrasing of Priam's plea, along with many aspects of the passage, 
is easily read as a substantive entry into the subject of human dignity 
for the Greeks. In "Dignity's Gauntlet;' Remy Debes cites the chorus 
of Antigone on the wondrousness of human beings, who are "mpremely 
valuable:' The use of deinos-which I translate above as "terrible" -
in both the choral ode of Antigone and this passage is not accidental. 
"Many are the wonders;' the deina, but none is more "terrible" or won­
drous than the human being, as the chorus of Antigone puts it. Similar 
to the human being (anthropos) in the chorus of Antigone, Achilles's 
14 I am perhaps evading an important aspect of the passage, namely the role of the gods in dignity 
and its resroration. I hope to handle this to some extent through the notion of reverence. 
15 See Homer, !li,,d, 14.478-79. As elsewhere, I here work from Murray's Loeb translation, adapting 
it based on my own interpretation of the Greek. 
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hands are not simply deinas because of the terrible damage they can 
cause. Rather, these terrible hands are a sign of humankind's capac­
ity for both the destructive and the wondrous, a range conveyed in a 
word with no parallel, deinos. As Debes puts it with regard to the tragic 
chorus, "Of course, those lines [from Antigone pertaining to man's dis­
tinctiveness] are juxtaposed against the tragic plot of that play and all 
of Creon's folly and hubris." 16 Similarly, the word deinas in Iliad 2.4 
conveys the damage that Achilles has done, but like the choral ode in 
Antigone, it does so against the backdrop of awe. 
So consider again Priam's approach to Achilles in a fuller context: 
Great Priam slipped into the tent without being noticed. He went 
right up to Achilles and clasped in his hands his knees, and kissed 
his hands, the terrible (deinas ), man-slaying hands that had slain his 
many sons. As when confusion (ate) comes on a man, who in his 
country killed another human being and goes to the home of oth­
ers, to some rich man, and amazement comes on those who look 
on him, so was Achilles struck with wonder at the sight of godlike 
Priam. They marveled (thambesin) at each other. They stared at each 
other. (2.4.477-84) 
The simile compares human to human, whereas most Homeric simi­
les are human to animal. The poet compares the sight of Priam to 
that of a murderer, and by extension Achilles to that of a man of 
wealth. The inversion is telling from the standpoint of human value. 
Achilles, the murderer, is an object of wonder, as if a rich man; Priam, 
a rich man, is likened to the murderer but also evokes wonder. In 
normative terms the murderer is removed from a place of value in 
society; he leaves his community, cast out, for a time of purification. 
The rich man, in those same terms, could be said to be in an elevated 
16 Debes. "Dignity's Gauntlet," 52. 
---- --·--- .,,. __ _ 
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place of value, that is, of greater "worth," at least within community. 
The community values a rich man more than it does a murderer, and 
rightly so. We might return here to the concern expressed earlier 
in this chapter that perhaps only some, for example, the elite, the 
rich, have a high comparative worth, or are axios, in Homeric soci­
ety. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of the one removed from society, 
the murderer, with the rich man, who has axios measurable in mon­
etary terms, does not in this passage point to comparative value. That 
is, the murder is worth no less. Rather, the comparison shows that 
both the rich man and the murderer are deinos. Awe is what equal­
izes both. Though removed from his local community or ethnos, the 
murderer is not removed from a space of human worth: he in fact 
arrives elsewhere, though outside of his own community, to a place 
of care. Nor because of his money is the rich man "raised above all 
price;' the Kantian claim of incommensurable value to which Debes 
returns in his discussions of human dignity. Rather, the rich man 
embodies a kind of value that approximates virtue, as only a person 
(as opposed to an animal) can achieve wealth and has the power to
wield it well or destructively. The rich man is deinos. The murderer, 
though, is also deinos and is valued simultaneously, in spite of his 
act-counterintuitively, in fact is valued because ofit. Many the won­
ders, but nothing is more deinos than humankind, in the ability both 
to build and to destroy, to be awesome, and awful. 
Similar to the rich man, Priam is a ruler of a kingdom who has 
enough wealth to have attained concubines for fifty sons and as many 
slaves. Given the depletion of energy and resources that comes with 
war, which is a wielding of wealth and power to destructive ends, Priam 
is on the brink of losing all, not unlike the murderer. Paradoxically, 
given his former status, Priam-virtually a pauper in terms of his loss­
stares at Achilles in the same way one would stare at the man of means. 
Achilles, though, is in fact not a rich man but herein the murderer, 
even if the killing occurs within the sanctioned context of war. W hat 
an unlikely comparison! Each man is deinos for the way in which the 
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condition of each-belonging and the loss of belonging, elevation and 
demotion-illuminates broader aspects of a shared, human condition. 
Throughout the passage the language of wonder is repeated: deinos, 
thambos. Achilles, now like the rich man, is something deinos, some­
thing rare in nature. If an expression of human dignity is the extent 
to which we treat others as an object of wonder, or reverence, then 
the wonder with which Priam and Achilles stare at each other is tell­
ing; they marvel at each other, thambeo. The emphasis in the passage 
on their visual regard for one another gives pause, as they momentarily 
interrupt the normal course of things-war, their mutual loss, their 
status as enemies-to take in all that it means for enemies to inhabit 
the same space and status. It might sound odd to reverence a murderer, 
whether the one within the simile, or Achilles himself, but this is just 
the right term. Reverence might be defined as "the well-developed 
capacity to have the feelings of awe, respect, and shame when these are 
the right feelings to have." 17 Many the awe-inspiring and awful things, 
but nothing is more awe-inspiring or awful than a person. 
From the passage, three interlinked aspects of the substance of 
human dignity, that is, what it looks like in practice even if Homer 
never formulates a thesis on what it is, are evident. First, that Achilles 
and Priam regard each other as one would wonder at the rich man­
or the murderer-is telling. They share the status of enemies, but this 
very fact is why the moment is poignant. Achilles's and Priam's com­
mon status as enemies paradoxically points to their stature as human 
beings. 18 Each person has lost a loved one in war, and their common 
loss unites them, momentarily, in grief. 
If regard, wonder, or reverence, is the first clue to human dignity in 
this passage, then "stature" as the reason for this wonder is the second. 
Although the idea of the imago Dei, the human being as made in the 
17 Paul Woodruff, Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 8. 
18 Kaceb, Human Dignity. 
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"image of God," cannot be said to be operative here in the same way 
chat it is in aJudeo-Chriscian context, the wonder, the deinos, is a result 
of a certain stature even in Homer. 19 It is telling chat the same epi­
thets denoting godlikeness are used of Hector upon his death. Jasper 
Griffin's comments are relevant here: 
The immediate juxtaposition of "god-like Hector" and "acts of 
humiliation" enables the poet to bring out, without sentimentality, 
che pathos of the greatest possible fall for a man, from god-like sta­
tus to humiliation and helplessness.20 
In an oral context where epithets ofi:en do not add meaning and some­
times serve merely metrical considerations, it is important to add that 
Priam is consistently "in the image of a god;' theoeides, or great, megas, 
throughout the passage. Griffin's comments regarding Hector extend 
both to Priam and to Achilles in this passage. The "godlike" reminds us 
of how far they have fallen in scams, and yet their stature as worthy of 
value has not changed. 
So what accounts for this stature: the fact chat even chose who have 
individual status as enemies, as murderers, as kings, are to be treated 
in a certain way? The answer to chis is the third aspect of dignity in 
the passage: the men share in reason, a sense of shame (akin to rev­
erence), and an ability to pity one another. While reason might be 
privileged in some contexts (cogito ergo sum), the interplay between 
reason and shame in the ancient world is critical to Greek selfhood. 
Dignity discourse ofi:en focuses on the first of these, reason, and yet 
shame and pity are linked to reason in the Homeric cext.21 Because 
Priam and Achilles have shared human stature, evidenced in reason, 
pity, and shame-all of which led to a mutual reverence-they are part 
19 Lacer in this volume, Bonnie Kent addresses dignity vis-a-vis the imago Dei. 
20 Griffin, Homer, 85. 
21 Bernard Williams, Sh.1me and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
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of a moral community of unearned worch.22 "Remember your father;' 
Priam says to Achilles, also, tellingly, theoeides, in the "image of a god." 
Given their shared stature and loss (ontological and experiential), it 
is fitting that Achilles have a sense of shame toward the gods, aideio 
theotts, and pity (eleeo) Priam. These men are human not only because 
they reason, but also because they have a developed and cultivated sense 
of pity and shame. The wonder that comes frorri reciprocally recogniz­
ing in the other-from reason, awe, and a sense of mutual suffering-a 
human condition reflects the substance of dignity in Homer as a "spe­
cial value to humans.''23 Achilles and Priam: each has human dignity, 
qua status, as a unique individual with special circumstances of loss, 
and qua stature, as beings of equal, unearned value. Recognizing this, 
Achilles must now return Hector's body. 
The poignant exchange between Achilles and Priam is one of three 
types of human relationships in the Homeric poems that evidence a 
regard for what might be identified as the substance of human dignity 
in archaic Greece. This first relationship, one that Achilles and Priam 
represent, is that of enemies toward each other. Similar to the other two 
relationships, the treatment of enemies throughout the poems points 
to the possibility of dignity's opposite, the possibility of the "erasure 
from the space of value.''24 Burial and other ritual aspects of the treat­
ment of enemies hint at a substantive sense of the value of all human 
life. In fact, if the exchange between Achilles and Priam is a moment 
of reconciliation and the high point of the epic, it is possible to find 
dignity's opposite in Achilles's treatment of Hector, the desecration of 
his body. The gods, particularly Apollo, express how appalled they are 
at Achilles's behavior in language that anticipates the right order of 
things at the epic's close. Apollo argues that Hector honored the gods 
12 Debes, "Dignity's Gauntlet;' 58. 
i, Remy Debes, "Human Dignity;• review of Hum,m Dignity by George Kateb, Notre D,m,e 
Philosophical Reviews, May i, io11. 
l4 Debes, "Human Dignity," on Katcb. 
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in life, and thus they are to feel shame in holding back from helping 
him now. Achilles is clearly out of step with the norms of Homeric 
society, which include the value given to one who had reason, felt pain 
and pleasure (emotions), and is deinos (had loved ones, did wonderful 
and destructive things): 
His mind is not right (.phrenes, enaisimoi), and his intentions 
(noema) are bent, like a wild lion, who goes among the sacrificial 
beasts of men with great force and fierceness in order to take his 
feast. In this way Achilles has destroyed pity (eleos) and has no 
shame (aidos). This condition harms men greatly and does not profit 
them. (2-4-40-45) 
The human-to-animal simile that follows offsets the human-to-human 
simile of the exchange between Achilles and Priam. Reason, the 
thoughts and intentions of a human being, it might be said, separates 
people from raging lions and other animals. Reason, of course, is the 
"uniqueness claim" associated with human dignity. Similar to a lion, a 
raging Achilles lacks the "inwardness" that makes of a beast a sacrificial 
animal (melon), something more than food. But reason does not stand 
alone. It enables a developed sense of shame, and pity. Whereas Priam 
asked Achilles to have pity (eleos) and a sense of shame (aidos) toward 
him, Apollo notes that Achilles lacks eleos or aidos toward Hector. Put 
in terms of dignity, Achilles has erased Hector from the space of value. 
His treatment of his enemy has reached a point of no return, the type 
of crisis that prompts divine intervention throughout Homeric epic. 
Thus the example of Achilles makes a positive case for a substantive 
understanding of human dignity in Homeric society. His mistreat­
ment of Hector, whom Achilles wants to give to dogs and birds of prey 
to devour, demonstrates what it would mean for a person within this 
social setting to dip below normative value, being now not worthy, 
axios, of good treatment. Through the gods, the presence of Priam, and 
Achilles's capitulation, the poet establishes this treatment as a violation 
- -�·-- -
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of the norm. The example of Achilles is emblematic of an approach to 
human dignity found throughout the Homeric poems. 
Although space here does not allow for an exhaustive study, I will 
briefly move from the arguments for a substantive claim to human 
dignity in Homer to an overview of other cases of the claim. These 
cases are the (I) treatment of slaves and the treatment of the less-than­
human, which would include animals, and (2) the natural landscape, 
the environment. 
EXAMPLES OF VIOLATIONS TO DIGNITY FROM 
THE ODYSSEY 
There are slaves in Homeric society, and this fact calls human dignity 
into question. Briseis and Chryseis are slaves, prizes won in battle and 
not free to come and go at their own will and pleasure. At the same 
time, the contrast in their treatment-the former loved by Achilles 
and the latter merely Agamemnon's possession-demonstrates in 
brief the contrast in _dignity studies between "unearned worth" (to 
love, cherish, value) and "equal worth" (to rule, to be able to enslave, 
to be able to have different social statuses within a class structure). As 
Debes explains, unearned worth is a metaphysical or conceptual claim, 
whereas equal worth is a normative claim.25 As a normative standard,
a society might not extend equal worth to every individual-a king 
is in tangible ways worth more than a beggar-while at the same 
time recognizing certain claims for all (slaves, women, and so on). In 
Homeric society as much as in modern parallels, how one treats the 
slave-the pauper, the beggar-is critical to the question of whether 
the person is reverenced or erased from the space of value. It is difficult 
to make this point without giving an impression of condoning slav­
ery. Nevertheless, evidence abounds that slavery, at least as it pertains 
>5 Debes, "Dignity's Gauntlec:• 59. 
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to the ancient Mediterranean and Near East, was at times the best 
recourse available to many members of society, such as the poor, the 
orphaned, and the defeated in war.26 Whereas the battlefield context
of the Iliad does not feature slaves and therefore does not give abun­
dant examples of their treatment, notwithstanding the women won in 
battle, Homer's Odyssey allows entry into domestic spaces where slaves 
abound in ancient Greece and even in Homeric society. In this con­
text, the slave Eumaeus and his reflections are of critical value. 
In the discussion of Hector above, his mistreatment was only for a 
time, a result of a momentary lapse on the part of Achilles. In contrast 
to this, Eumaeus endures years of mistreatment at the hands of the suit­
ors, in the absence of his master Odysseus. Upon Odysseus's return to 
his homeland of Ithaca from ten years of war and ten years of wander­
ing, Eumaeus, his slave, secures Odysseus's entry into his own home. 
The story of how Eumaeus became a slave points to human dignity 
and its erasure. Unlike his current handlers, Odysseus treated Eumaeus 
well, and despite his current condition, Eumaeus seems to believe that 
Odysseus, although disguised as a beggar, is deserving of good treat­
ment. Similar to Odysseus's incidental status, slavery for Eumaeus is 
a condition into which he has simply fallen. His current status belies 
his true worth. Eumaeus's father, Ctesius, was a man of status epieikelos 
athanatoisin, "like the gods:' Ctesius is a ruler of not one but two cities 
in Syria, but the advent of Phoenician traders disrupts domestic bliss. 
These greedy men (troktoi) seduce Eumaeus's nursemaid, who is also 
Phoenician and eager to reconnect to her group. The traders take the 
Phoenician woman and the young Eumaeus away from his homeland 
and sell them for profit (more money, more food). 
Given the distinctiveness or moral specialness claim in discussions of 
human dignity (which has been evident thus far from Homer's Iliad), 
26 Patrice Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave: 1he Ritual of Domination and Social Death in 
Homeric Society;• in Reading Ancient Slivery, ed. Richard Alston, Edith Hall, and Laura Proffitt 
(New York: Bristol, 2ou), 34-50. 
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it should not be surprising that troktoi, the greedy Phoenician men, is 
linguistically rooted in eating: for example, animals eating meat raw. 
The connection to Achilles, who threatens to eat Hector's body raw, 
is easily drawn. Like Achilles, the Phoenicians practice a vice; they do 
not know limits. They are out of step with their broader human com­
munity. This is in fact the problem with traders as they are represented 
in Homeric society: they disrupt a value system by conferring value on 
coinage and trade based on approximate value. 
Eumaeus, like anyone in human society, finds himself at some point 
at the mercy of others. If one is bereft of homeland or a means of re­
entry (like the murderer in the Iliadic passage), in a frontier outside of 
cities and their civic order, the kindness of strangers ( e.g., kings, rich 
men, that is, persons of higher material worth and those of more stable 
statuses in society) is paramount. The poet describes Eumaeus as a man 
"who could have commanded a platoon in war" (14.2.5). In other words, 
his unequal status in society as a slave does not destroy his unearned 
worth as a person. Slavery disrupts only his human potential, not his 
humanness. One might go as far as to say that Eumaeus, if not "esteemed 
beyond all price;' is richly valued, despite the suitors' treatment of him. 
His father certainly richly valued him. He has noble birth, and the poet 
addresses him by apostrophe, the second-person address reserved for a 
few beloved characters in Homeric poetry. The fact that Eumaeus spends 
his time as a slave "cutting the tanned leather to size" does not make him 
any less godlike (dios ), even as he speaks of his master Odysseus with an 
awe similar to that which is owed to Eumaeus (antitheos). 
Odysseus's disguise as a beggar, necessary for his re-entry into Ithaca, 
allows the audience some view of the domestic space in Homeric soci­
ety, where slaves and other dependents are present. Odysseus's disguise 
and his lies about having been a slave express a set of cultural truths, 
and in particular underline his shared humanity with Eumaeus.27 
17 Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave," 34-so. 
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Odysseus's higher social value-his status-as a king does not ulti­
mately protect him from the potential violation of his unearned mem­
bership in a mo�al community. That is, he is now similar to a slave. 
What protects him from mistreatment, now that he is not a ruler? On 
the other side, Eumaeus has undergone both kind and unkind treat­
ment, and he chooses to extend hospitality to the stranger whom he 
does not yet recognize as his own master: 
Stranger (xenos), even if someone worse than you came, it would not 
be right (themis) for me to dishonor a xenos. From Zeus come all 
xenoi and beggars. Our gifi:s to them are small but dear. This is how 
it is with slaves because we are always in fear, especially when young 
kings rule. (14.56-61) 
A sense of what is right (themis) even toward those of lesser social status 
("someone worse than you," kakion) drives Eumaeus's thinking, inten­
tion, and practice toward strangers (xenos). Strangers and beggars are 
like slaves because they are dependent upon the kindness of those of 
higher social status or those more tightly woven into the community. 
Odysseus weaves a false tale of how he too was sold into slavery and 
made to work (ergon) as the telos of his value. These stories of Odysseus 
as slave, though lies, link up with Eumaeus's narrative and thus express 
the deeper truth regarding human value in the Homeric poems. 28
The treatment of enemies emblematic of the exchange between 
Achilles and Priam, along with the treatment of slaves and all those 
of lesser rank in society (strangers, beggars, the poor, the orphaned), 
is a case for the substance of human dignity in Homeric society. Both 
kinds of treatment point to the human being's unearned worth, and 
specifically, something like unearned membership in a shared (human) 
moral community. 
18 Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave." 
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The third and final relationship to consider in Homeric lore is the 
treatment of the less-than-human, which is an aspect of the philosoph­
ical discourse of dignity attributable to Kateb.29 As he argues, because
of the stature of the human being, which is linked to reason, the ability 
to express reverence and pity, and even the ability to protect others, we 
are given stewardship of nature, namely "the impossible task of making 
nature be to itself."30 Stewardship of nature is an expression of rever­
ence, or awe, a sense that nature, like man, is itself deinon, a "marvelous 
thing." As it pertains to the Greek context, the Homeric poems show a 
profound regard for this aspect of dignity. The presence of dogs in the 
domestic space of the Odyssey, for example, is canny because of what it 
might be read to signal about the way the stature of a person impacts 
his or her surroundings. 
In one of the passages discussed above, where Odysseus first appears 
in Eumaeus's hut, dogs rush the stranger. Eumaeus shoos them. While 
the incident could be treated as one of those throwaway, possible sub­
plots that Eric Auerbach talks about in terms of the "retarding" style 
of epic narrative (with all possible plots foregrounded and none subor­
dinated),31 Eumaeus's shooing of the dogs is more telling than it might 
seem at first glance. As Eumaeus himself puts it, he is accountable 
(elencho) for the hounds. Had the dogs mauled the stranger of low sta­
tus, Eumaeus ( or his master) would have been liable, and he already has 
enough grief (algea, stonachas) in his life, having been bereft of home­
land, family, the safety of status, and even Odysseus over the foregoing 
twenty years. 
Of course, Eumaeus's relationship to these nameless dogs parallels 
that of Odysseus to Argus, the faithful dog that the master left behind 
for twenty years, who now lies in lice and disregarded in dung that 
29 Kate 6, Hum,m Di_'(llity. 
JO Kateb, Human Di,'(llity, , 17. 
JI Eric Auerbach, .Mimesis: 1be Representation of Reality in H'estern Liter,zture, trans. Willard R. 
Trask (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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could have been used to fertilize the land. (There is such an econo­
mizing of resources in the Homeric worldview.) And yet Argus cannot 
die until he recognizes that his master, even disguised, has returned 
(17.290-305). Such is his loyalty. Through the animal, the third expres­
sion of how human beings treat others, the poet makes a deliberate 
though as yet untheorized point about dignity. 
PRECURSORS TO UNIVERSAL DIGNITY IN CLASSICAL 
GREECE AFTER HOMER 
My aim here has been to raise the premise of a substantive claim to 
human dignity in Homeric society, the fictive context from which 
much of our sense of preclassical Greek society after the Bronze Age 
derives. Rather than a history of the emergence of dignity, the Homeric 
poems and context show dignity operating as a substantive claim from 
the beginnings of Near Eastern and early European societies.32 What 
would be lefi: for philosophers is the theorization of dignity as a for­
mal or theoretical concern. In the pages that follow, I would like to 
suggest that there are further seeds of the discourse of dignity in clas­
sical Greece. It will be left to other scholars to amply these claims or 
reject them. 
In many areas of thought, Homer, as Eric Havelock argues, is a kind 
of preface to Plato.33 The moral, ethical, and social arrangements in 
these poems are a baseline to which the Greek playwrights and, later, 
Plato and Aristotle will return. Greek popular morality can to a great 
extent be derived from these poems, and examples abound: the play­
wrights' indirect references to Homer in such plays as Euripides's 
Hemba; Socrates's citation of Hector's bravery in death, in the Apology; 
or Aristotle's use of examples for moral persuasion, in Rhetoric. Thus 
if there is any substantive evidence of human dignity in the Greek 
Ji Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave." 
JJ Eric Havdock,Pref.ue to Plato (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univmicy Press, 198i). 
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context, finding that evidence would mean starting with Homer. From 
there, we might draw examples from the playwrights for places where a 
demonstration of what looks like dignity might be found. Each of the 
playwrights presents ample evidence of dignity and, what is more, its 
violation, given the context of ritual sacrifice and loss at the festival of 
Dionysus. 
Examples from Aeschylus might include Agamemnon's violation 
of a certain reverence for the life of his daughter Iphigenia (Oresteia), 
a sacrifice that resounds even as far off as the Roman poet Lucretius 
in the first century DCE as an instance of religion's failure "to guard 
and protect what has dignity";34 In the Oresteia (458 DCE), Aeschylus 
is interested in the shift from greatness to defeat, such as is found in 
Agamemnon's downfall. This concern perhaps parallels the decline of 
great aristocratic families that marks the historical advent of demo­
cratic society. If Agamemnon loses his status and faces the violation of 
his dignity in his manner of death in the first play of the Oresteia, by 
the end of the trilogy Orestes has not only restored his family's honor 
in his slaughter of his mother Clytemnestra, his father's killer, but he 
has also yielded to the power of the Athenian scare, where the Furies 
protect the ancient blood-price for Clytemnestra's death at the court of 
the Areopagus. Aeschylus's Persians is also important to the discussion, 
as a play that reifies the deep divide between Greek and non-Greek, 
what Edith Hall calls rhe invention of the barbarian (the beginning 
of an ancient orientalism),3S which would continue throughout 
the classical period. And yet, despite the inadvertent inscription of 
the Persians as "ocher" in the play, the profound humanity of their 
plight-the groaning, Atossa's lamentations, the general sense of this 
foreign people's loss in status as a result of the Persian Wars-is central 
to Aeschylus's representation. 
34 Debes, "Human Dignity," 60. 
31 Edith Hall, Inventing the B,zrbarian: Greek Self Definition through Tr<1gedy (Oxford University 
Press), 1989. 
( 
DIGNITY 
Any place where a shift in status attends, the substance of dignity 
can be felt because such a shift calls into question the worth of the 
person, his or her stature as raised above all price. If there were a moral 
community of unearned worth that transcends the local community 
(the ethnos) or the city-state (the polis), a shift in status would exposes 
the limits of the local context. For example, Euripides's Hecuba (424 
BCE) has been one play that features the degradation of the captive, 
slave woman, but it is only one of many.36 Hecuba's shift from queen to
slave, similar to Eumaeus's experience, disrupts how axia or "worth it" 
she might be to her own society, but it also enables her to claim a value 
that transcends her local environment. How a society treats enemies, 
slaves, and the less-than-human matters to dignity, and thus Hecuba 
indicts the Greeks because of their poor treatment of her. In fact, the 
playwrights could be said to be working through the very problem 
of human dignity, even though the historical circumstances of fifth­
century Athens engendered no deeper reaction, no more profound 
theorization, than they offered. 
Similar to Eumaeus and even Odysseus in Homer's Odyssey, Hecuba 
has happened into a shift in status, from queen ro slave, as a result of 
the fall of Troy. The circumstances of the play have been read as an 
ongoing dehumanization of Hecuba. As if slavery were not enough, 
pressure is put on her throughout the play, such that continued insult 
leads to behavior not becoming of a queen. First, in addition to suf­
fering a shift in status to slave, she learns that the Greeks will kill her 
daughter, Polyxena, in a sacrifice over the tomb of Achilles. The exter­
nalization of a process of reason comes in the Greeks' debate about 
whether or not to conduct this sacrifice, until Odysseus, a democharistes 
("crowd-pleaser"), casts the dice. Euripides, similar to Thucydides 
in his treatment of Cleon (a demagogos or "demagogue" who sways 
the community with arguments toward questionable ends), casts 
36 Patrice Rankine, Ulysses in Black: Ralph Ellison, Clusicism, and African Amerimn Literatrere 
(University of Wisconsin Press), 1006. 
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Odysseus in a complicated role, that of a sophist who might be making 
the weaker argument appear the stronger. Hecuba appeals to the same 
question of how far the ethical community extends to what Philoctetes 
prompts in chat play. She claims to have once saved Odysseus's life at 
Troy, respecting his stature as human being over his status as an enemy 
in war. Odysseus rejects the argument, offering no friendship in war, 
no treaty among enemies. In the play, Hecuba suffers what might be 
deemed to be existential harm because she is outside of any and every 
community: her Trojan community is lost, and the Greeks respect no 
treaty or bond with her. W hat is more, she discovers chat her ally and 
friend in Troy, Polymester, has killed her son Polydorus, whom she and 
Priam sent away from Troy to him for safekeeping at the beginning of 
the war. Now all is lost, and Hecuba resorts co the primitive justice of 
vengeance with which the Oresteia opened (that is, an appeal co human 
rights, laws chat extend co strangers and slaves, more than the ethical 
practices we saw in Homer, etc.). In the absence of dignity as part of 
ethics, Hecuba is subject to existential harm, but this is a tragic frame, a 
space of crisis, not the normal state of things in classical Greece. 
The impact of the democratic shift on ethics-the treatment of ene­
mies, friendships, and relationships to the state, which Hecuba calls 
"equality under the law"-continue to be felt throughout the play­
wrights. In Sophocles's Philoctetes ( 409 BCE), Neoptolemus, son of the 
late Achilles, faces a moral dilemma in his attempt to retrieve Herakles's 
bow and arrow from Philoctetes, whom the Greeks, led by Odysseus, 
abandoned on a deserted island at the beginning of the Trojan War 
because of his festering wound. They have left him there for ten years, 
but a prophecy now reveals chat they cannot defeat Troy without the 
bow and arrows. The moral dilemma comes when Odysseus enjoins 
Neoptolemus to retrieve the bow and arrows. Spending time with 
Philoctetes causes a shift for Neoptolemus, what amounts to an ephe­
bic rite of passage chat challenges his ethics. Not only has he come to 
pity Philoctetes, with pathos as a starting point for the regard of the 
other, but Neoptolemus has also come to regard Philoctetes as a friend 
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because of the man's friendship with his own father. That is, if Greek 
popular morality, as Kenneth Dover put it, calls for helping friends 
and harming enemies, why would Neoptolemus continue the ongo­
ing harm that the Greeks have done to Philoctetes, who is a friend of 
his friends ?37 Where human friendships end-how far the civic com­
munity extends to a broader human community-is unsolvable in the 
play's final resolution, as it is in Hecuba. Philoctetes attempts a solution 
through a deus ex machina, in which Herakles, now a god, appears to 
tell the Greek community that they need his bow and arrow as well as
Philoctetes himself. No warrior should be lefi: behind; Philoctetes has 
worth, despite the decade of devaluation that lefi: him bereft of friends, 
food, and shelter, and a legacy commensurate to his former status. The 
loss of worth that a Greek noble can endure challenges the system of 
values in the classical texts, just as it did in the Homeric context. 
EPILOGUE 
It is worth returning to the search for a formal claim co dignity among 
the Greeks with which I opened. The evidence of dignity as a sub­
stantive reality in Homeric society and in classical Greece should 
be clear. People have dignity throughout the ancient Mediterranean 
and Near East, if we base this on the cultural standards for how ene­
mies are treated; how strangers, slaves, and beggars are to be treated; 
and how these societies regard the less-than-human. Thus, while the 
Homeric epics represent Greek society at its best-even in the con­
text of war, wandering, and the bad behavior of rulers in the absence 
of the kind king-the representation of violations to human dignity 
in tragedy gives deliberate pause to the emerging concern of a wide­
spread dehumanization of others. This existential threat to human dig­
nity results from the premise of imperialism that marks the classical 
37 Kenneth J. Dover, Greek Pop11lir Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1994). 
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period. The playwrights, along with Thucydides, whose descriptive and 
diagnostic treatment of Athenian imperialism falls short of a theory 
of human dignity, nevertheless continue the epic tradition of asking 
where the human and ethical community begins and ends. Following 
Thucydides's analysis of such events as plague and civil strife, it is clear 
that the good treatment of everyone within and outside of particular 
local communities is an ideal to be guarded jealously. Human dignity, 
in practice, is clearly a virtue that can easily slip away, or as Thucydides 
puts it of war, plague, and civil strife, human nature, being what it is, 
these things will happen again. 
